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 
Abstract-- We establish sufficient conditions for nodal price 
response matrix in electric power system to be symmetric and 
negative (semi-)definite. The results are applicable for electricity 
markets with nonlinear and intertemporal constraints. 
 
Index Terms-- Power system economics, electricity market, 
nodal pricing, residual demand, price response. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
ecent decades had witnessed gradual liberalization of 
electric power sectors in a number of markets with 
restructuring of vertically-integrated utilities into power 
generation, supply, and transmission/distribution businesses. 
Unbundling of competitive sectors from naturally 
monopolistic businesses paved the way to introduction of free 
market pricing for power. We will consider the power markets 
based on the nodal pricing [1]-[3] and focus on the sensitivity 
of the locational marginal prices (LMP) with respect to 
infinitesimal nodal injections of costless power. The 
sensitivity analysis of LMP naturally arises in a number of 
problems including profit maximization of a generation firm 
with market power [4].  
Consider the firm g operating generating units located in a 
set of nodes }{i . Let hix ,  denote power injection of the 
corresponding generating unit in node (bus) i  at our h , hi,   
be the corresponding nodal price, })({
,hixc  be the firm power 
production cost function, then in the absence of binding 
constraints on variables }{
,hix  the first-order conditions for 
profit optimization problem for g  selling all power at the 
DAM nodal prices implies 
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where the summation is performed over all nodes i , i  of the 
network with g ’s generating units and all hours h , h  of the 
DAM period. Equation (1) implies that additional revenue 
received by the firm due to the exercise of the market power is 
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set by the symmetric part of the nodal price response matrix 
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. If the matrix is negative semi-definite, then RHS 
of (1) is non-negative and the firm receives non-negative 
markup due to its market power. That is why symmetry and 
sign definiteness of the nodal price response matrix is of 
special interest for both market players and regulators.  
The sensitivity problem for one-period DAM has been 
extensively studied in [5]-[9] for DC model, i.e., for the case 
of linear constraints without intertemporal constraints (such as 
ramping constraints). In [5]-[9] using sensitivity analysis of 
the first-order conditions of the corresponding optimization 
problem it was established that in DC model the nodal price 
response matrix is symmetric and negative (semi-)definite 
matrix. In [9] the closed form solution for the nodal price 
response matrix was obtained in DC model for a piece-wise 
quadratic cost function. The approach utilized in [5]-[9] 
heavily relies on the special structure of the first-order 
conditions in DC model and explicit expression for nodal price 
response matrix obtained from sensitivity analysis of the first-
order conditions. For the case of linear constraints with 
quadratic power production cost function the price response 
matrix is constant in each interval with unaltered set of 
binding constraints.  
Full optimal power flow model with set unit commitment 
schedule for multi-period DAM accounts for transit losses in 
electric lines, ramping constraints, etc., and hence includes 
nonlinear constraints as well as intertemporal constraints. In 
the case of nonlinear constraints, the price response matrix is 
not constant even for quadratic power production cost function 
(and may have significantly different sensitivity values for the 
large power systems with transit power losses), thus making 
the solution of the supplier profit maximization problem more 
challenging. Since binding intertemporal constraints may 
change the outcome of the nodal price response matrix 
calculation, they should be taken into account.  
We study the multi-period DAM with nonlinear and 
intertemporal constraints (i.e., the cases when the explicit 
expression for the price response matrix is unavailable) and 
illustrate that symmetry and negative (semi-)definiteness of 
the matrix follow from more general conditions on the 
underlying optimization problem without use of explicit 
expression for the matrix. Thus, the main contribution of the 
present paper is to extend the results of [5]-[9] to the case of 
multi-period DAM with nonlinear and intertemporal 
constraints to show that the symmetry of nodal price response 
matrix originates from general properties of the Lagrange 
multipliers, when exogenous parameters enter additively in the 
binding constraints, satisfying the linear independence 
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constraint qualification (LICQ), while the negative (semi-
)definiteness of the nodal price response matrix is readily 
obtained in this framework for the instance of convex 
constraints (which incorporates the DC model case as well). 
As in [9] we require LICQ because, in contrast to other more 
general constraint qualification conditions, it implies that the 
binding constraint set locally doesn’t induce any constraints 
on the additive exogenous parameters, so that their values can 
vary independently and partial derivatives over the parameters 
can be considered. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section II is devoted to 
application of the general statements to LMP, which are 
further generalized in section III, section IV provides 
illustration of the findings for the case with binding 
intertemporal constraint, the section V contains conclusion, in 
section VI we recall general properties of the Lagrange 
multipliers’ derivatives with respect to parameters entering the 
constraints additively. Throughout the paper we adopt LICQ 
as constraint qualification condition.  
II.  DAM WITH FIXED UNIT COMMITMENT SCHEDULE 
Consider wholesale multi-period day ahead electric power 
market (DAM) with set unit commitment schedule operating 
on bid-based security constrained economic dispatch principle 
according to the financially binding offers/bids supplied by 
wholesale market players. Let DAM with hourly locational 
marginal pricing be cleared simultaneously for all hours of the 
next day based on the optimization of the market utility 
(objective) function U  with optimization (decision) variables 
z  taking values in ||zR , (where ||   denotes a cardinality of a 
set). Variables z  are decomposed into hourly nodal power 
injection/withdrawal variables q  and variables u , describing 
the hourly power flow in the system (for example, in DC 
model variables u  are identified with phase angles of nodal 
voltage levels, in full AC model u  include hourly power flow 
volumes in each line of the network, nodal voltage magnitudes 
and phase angles, etc.). For simplicity we assume that there is 
only one generation or consumption unit in each node and 
denote the corresponding nodal power injection/withdrawal 
volume in hour h  by 
hnq , , Nn ,...,1 , with N  being total 
number of nodes in the system. Thus, },{ uqz   and 
}{ ,hnqq  . The feasible set of z  produced by constraints 
)}({ zG , involving both constraints in the form of equalities as 
well as those in the form of weak inequalities, is assumed to 
be nonempty compact subset of Euclidean space || zR . (To 
ensure compactness of the feasible set z  and avoid dealing 
with multiple physically equivalent solutions to DAM problem 
differing in phase angles values by 2  multiples, the 
set )}({ zG  includes constraints on phase angles values limiting 
their feasible values to the corresponding close intervals with 
widths less than 2 ).  
The DAM optimization problem has the form 
)(
}.{.
,
max qU
Gts
z
   (2) 
with market utility function prodcons UUU  , where consU  
and prodU  are additively separable total daily cost of power 
consumption as bid by the consumers and the total daily cost 
of power as offered by the producers respectively. It is 
assumed that market players submit distinct bids/offers with 
respect to each consumption/generation unit. If consumers 
may submit only totally inelastic DAM bids, then usually the 
term consU  is omitted from the function U , and the set }{G  is 
properly extended to account for the fixed consumption 
volumes.  
We assume that the constraint functions )}({ zG are twice 
continuously differentiable functions of z  and the bid/offered 
prices are piece-wise continuous functions of the respective 
injection/withdrawal volumes, hence, the function )(qU  is 
continuous. Compactness of the feasible set and continuity of 
the objective function ensure that its maximum value is 
attainable. In what follows we also assume that (2) has a 
unique maximizer, which we denote by *z . 
The set }{G  typically includes transmission constraints due 
to the power flow thermal or security limits, nodal power 
balance equations, power losses and power flow equations 
(Kirchhoff laws), generating unit constraints. The latter 
account for minimal/maximal output volumes, ramping rates, 
fuel constraints, etc. Let’s denote a subset of )},({ uqG , 
binding at *zz  , by )},({ uqC  and partition the latter as 
follows 
)}(),,(),({)},({ uuCuqquCqqCuqC     (3) 
with constraint subset )}({ qCq describing generation and 
consumption unit constraints, which are assumed to be 
functions of injection/consumption volumes in that node only 
(possibly in different hours), subset )},({ uqCqu  being  a set of 
hourly nodal power balance constraints of the form 
0)(),( ,,,  hnhnqu
hn
qu qufuqC , with “plus” sign if 
hnq ,  
corresponds to power consumption and with “minus” sign in 
the case of power generation, NuqCqu 24|),(|  , subset 
)}({ uCu  being attributed to electric power flow equations, 
network power flow limits, etc., with subscripts “ q ”, ” qu”, 
and ” u ” referring to the constraint type and not being vector 
or matrix indices. We assume that a set of binding constraints 
)},({ uqC  has cardinality less than || z  and satisfies constraint 
qualification condition with respect to variables ),( uq . In this 
setting the nodal price in node n  at hour h , which we denote 
by hn, , equals the Lagrange multiplier to the constraint 
0),(, uqC hnqu . We note that for different hours of the day the 
sets of binding inequality constraints can differ.  
As the firm g  operates generating units located in a set of 
nodes }{i , let }{s  denote the rest of the nodes in the system, 
}{ ,hix  and }{
,hsy  denote }{
,hiq  and }{
,hsq   respectively, 
}{ ,hixх  , }{ ,hsyy  , )(xU g  denote the offered costs by g  
and )(yU g  denote the other market players contribution to the 
market utility function, so that )()( xUyUU gg  . The sets 
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of constraints )}({ qCq , )},({ uqCqu  assume the following 
structure: 
)}(),({)}({ yCxCqC yxq 
)},(),,({)},({ uyCuxCuqC yuxuqu  , 
0)(),( ,,,  hihixu
hi
xu xufuxC , 0)(),(
,,,  hshsyu
hs
yu yufuyC . 
The constraint set )}(),,(),,(),({}{ uCuyCuxCyCC uyuxuy  is 
referred to as reduced binding constraint set at *zz  . We 
observe that х  as well as y  (up to a sign) enter additively in 
the reduced constraint set functions.  
Let’s denote by xD  the feasible set for x , i.e., the set of x  
such that there exists ),( uy , so that ),,( uyx  satisfies the 
constraint set }{G , and by )(),( xD uy  the set of all those ),( uy  
for a given value of xDx . Fixing a feasible value of x  we 
obtain an optimization subproblem of (2): 
)(max)(
)(),(
,,
),(
yUxW g
xDuy
uy
g
uy


 (4) 
with )(xWg  being the optimal value of the market utility 
function when the firm g  supplies x  costless volumes of  
power in the corresponding nodes at respective hours of the 
day. The reduced binding constraint set }{C  specifies a set of 
binding constraints for the problem (4). We emphasize that the 
set }{C  may not satisfy constraint qualification for a given 
solution for ),( uy  of subproblem (4), and can be potentially 
redundant with some constraints being functions of the others. 
Relation of subproblem (4) to the problem (2) is given by 
 )]()([max )(max 
,
}.{.
,
xUxWqU gg
Dx
x
Gts
z
x


.  (5) 
Note that some of the constraints }{G , like )}({ xCx , impose 
restrictions on x  only and involve neither y nor u . However, 
in general case the constraints }{G  may also imply some 
additional implicit constraints on x , including the binding 
ones. Hence, generally speaking, the set of binding constraints 
on variables x  only, implied by )},({ uqC , may be larger than 
)}({ xCx .   
Let’s introduce costless power injections }{ ,hia  with hia ,  
being injection in node i  at hour h  of the day. That formally 
corresponds to a substitution 
hihihi axx ,,,   in the nodal 
power balance constraint for a node i  at hour h . The 
substitutions hihihi axx ,,,   in ),(, uxC hixu  generate 
)()( ),(),( axDxD uyuy   and produce a -dependent feasible 
set of x : )(aDD xx  . Therefore, when }{
,hia  are 
introduced, the problem (4) is considered for )(aDx x  and 
the corresponding value function equals )( axWg  . Hence, if 
the Envelope Theorem (as stated in Appendix) is applicable 
for (2) at 0a , then we have the following identity for the 
nodal price at node i  at hour h : 
   )()(max
0a
)(
,,
,



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
 xUaxW
a
gg
aDx
xhi
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x
 , (6) 
with 
)(max)(
)(),(
,,
),(
yUaxW g
axDuy
uy
g
uy


.      (7) 
Equations (6)-(7) state that in general case both  )( axWg 
 
and the binding constraints on x , corresponding to the 
feasible set )(aDx , are dependent on a  with two of these 
circumstances leading to nodal price 
hi,  dependence on 
bids/offers of the market players other than g , while the latter 
circumstance being responsible for 
hi,  dependence on the 
firm g  offers. 
Dependence of 
hi,  on the bids/offers of market players 
needs some clarification. Deformation of a bid/offer of a 
market player may result in the corresponding change in DAM 
outcomes including the player’s nodal consumption/injection 
volumes. Let’s consider a set of all bids/offers of a market 
player which result in the same values of nodal 
injection/consumption volumes as outcomes of DAM. We will 
say that the nodal price 
hi,  is independent from the market 
player bid/offer, if any bid/offer from the abovementioned set 
results in the same value of 
hi, . In that sense, the function 
)(xWg  is independent from the firm g  offers from the 
abovementioned set as it directly follows from (4).  We would 
like to state conditions for a set of nodal prices }{ ,hi  in nodes 
}{i  for all hours of the day to be independent from the firm 
g offers. 
Proposition 1. If the following assumptions, additional to 
explicit assumptions stated in this section, are met: there 
exists xDx 
*
 such that 
1. for any x  in )( *x  - some neighborhood of *xx   - the 
problem (4) has a unique solution )(
* xyy  , )(* xuu  , and 
these functions are continuous in )(
*x ; 
2. in some neighborhood of )(* xyy   the function )(yU g  is 
twice continuously differentiable;   
3. the set of constraints of the problem (4), binding at the 
solution of (4) for any x  in )(
*x , is given by the reduced 
constraint set }{C  with cardinality no higher than |||| uy  ; 
4. the set of binding constraints }{C  satisfies constraint 
qualification at the solution of (4) for *xx  : rank of  
 
)(),( ****
,
xuuxyy
m
u
m
y CC   is maximal; 
5. if the kernel of   
)(),( ****
,
xuuxyy
m
u
m
y CC   is 
nontrivial, then we assume that the Hessian matrix with 
respect to ),( uy  of the Lagrangian 
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),,()()(),,( uyxCxyUuyxL m
m
mg   at *xx  , 
)( ** xyy  , )( ** xuu  , restricted to the kernel, is invertible, 
where )}({ xm  denote Lagrange multipliers associated with 
the reduced set of binding constraints }{C  (for m  
corresponding to ),(, uxC hixu  we denote )(xm  by )(, xhi ); 
then there exists a neighborhood of *xx   such that for any 
x  in that neighborhood the following statements are true: 
a. the hourly nodal prices 
hi,  are independent from the 
firm g  offers; 
b. hi,  are continuously differentiable functions of x  and 
matrix hi
hi xx

 ,, /)(  is symmetric under ),(),( hihi  ; 
c. if in addition in some open neighborhood of 
))(),(( **** xuxy  the function )(yU g  is (weakly) concave and 
the set }{C  is convex (viewed as functions of variables y  and 
u ), then there is an open neighborhood of *xx   such that 
the matrix 
hi
hi xx

 ,, /)( is negative (semi-)definite in that 
neighborhood.  
Proof: Constraint qualification and smoothness of constraint 
and objective functions in (4) allow to use Karush–Kuhn–
Tucker method and introduce Lagrange multiplier for each 
constraint of the set }{C . Since the set }{C  satisfies 
constraint qualification at *xx  , so  it does in some )( *x 1 
as well. Therefore, the set }{C  doesn’t imply any constraints 
on x  in )
*(x  and the problem (4) can be considered for 
unconstrained )(
*xx  . Considerations similar to the ones 
made in Appendix imply that )(
*xx   the first-order 
condition for (4) allows to uniquely determine both )(
* xyy   
and )(
* xuu   as well as Lagrange multipliers )}({ xm , with 
the corresponding functions being continuously differentiable 
functions in )(
*x  independent from the firm g  offers. 
Hence, )(, xhi  are continuously differentiable functions in 
)( *x . From analysis presented in Appendix it follows that 
the Envelope Theorem is applicable to the subproblem (4) and 
in )(
*x  we have 
hi
ghi xxWx
,
, /)()(  . (8) 
                                                          
1
 As our analysis requires frequent referrals to an open neighborhood of 
*xx  , which is some open subset of )(
*x  defined above, for simplicity 
we will refer to that subset as )(
*x  as well and will tacitly assume that 
)( *x  has been properly redefined. All the neighborhoods considered in this 
paper are assumed to be open neighborhoods. 
 
Thus, the set of nodal prices )(, xhi
 
can be viewed as 
components of the gradient of function )(xWg .
 
 Since the 
first-order conditions for (4) make subset of the first-order 
conditions for (2), we have )( *,, xhihi   . Hence, the nodal 
prices }{ ,hi  
in nodes }{i  for all hours of the day are 
independent from firm g  offers (provided that the offers 
result in the same supply volumes x  as defined above). From 
(8) it follows that hi
hi
hi
hi xxxx
,
,
,
, /)(/)(  
   in )( *x . 
If )(yU g  is weakly concave and the residual set of binding 
constraints is convex, then negative semi-definiteness of 
hi
hi xx

 ,, /)(  follows from considerations in Appendix as 
Hessian matrices of )(yU g  and ),,()( uyxCx
m
m
m  with 
respect to variables ),( uy  are negative semi-definite (with 
equality constraints not contributing to the latter). Moreover, if 
)(yU g  is strictly concave, then 
hi
hi xx

 ,, /)(  is negative 
definite. Thus, the Proposition 1 is proved. 
Assumptions 3 and 4 of Lemma 1 imply that none of g 's 
offers is marginal, which limits applicability of the lemma, 
while the other Lemma 1 assumptions are often prove to be 
valid in practical applications. 
We also note that in the case of DC current model with 
(weakly) concave quadratic objective function, 
hi
hi xx

 ,, /)(  is constant matrix in )(
*x . 
Although *xx   is feasible, we do not require xDx )(
*   
as there may not be such an open neighborhood. Thus, the 
problem (4) is formally considered for all points )(
*xx  , 
even the unfeasible ones. In this sense }
,
{
hi
x  -  the 
corresponding components of x  - are unconstrained and 
independent as long as the points belong to )
*(x  and hence 
the partial derivatives over 
hi
x
,
 can be considered. 
We also note, that if the Envelope Theorem is applicable to 
the original problem (2) as well, the introduction of }
,
{
hi
a  
doesn’t alter the set of binding constraints }{C : in some 
neighborhood of 0a  no new binding constraints are 
introduced and no binding constraint becomes nonbinding. 
 Since the reduced binding constraint set }{C  doesn’t impose 
any additional constraints on variables x , at )(
* axx   the set 
)}({ xСx  is the set of binding constraints corresponding to the 
feasible set )(aDx  and satisfying constraint qualification as a 
subset of )},({ uqС . For introduction of }{ ,hia  doesn’t 
introduce explicit dependence on a  in )}({ x
x
C , using (6) and 
the statement of Lemma 2 in Appendix, we have 
** xx
,
0a
(0)xx
,,
)(  )(




















 xW
x
axW
a
ghighihi
    ,  (9) 
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where we have used )0(** xx   and the fact that )(* ax  - the 
solution for x  as a function of a  - is unique (which is 
implied by the assumption of the Envelope Theorem 
applicability for (2)).  
Thus, if the problem (4) is considered only for xDx , it 
may not be legitimate to take partial derivatives over hix , , 
thus derivatives are taken over hia , . However, due to the 
constraint qualification of }{C , the problem (4) can be 
considered )( *xx  , thus enabling computation of partial 
derivatives over 
hix , , which is manifest in (8) and (9). That 
observation also entails that )(, xhi  with }{
,hixx

  is 
interpreted as hourly nodal price in given hour h  and node 
}{ii , when at each hour h  of the day and each node 
}{ii   the firm g  injects costless power in the amount of 
hix
, .  
III.  GENERALIZATION 
In the previous section we dealt with the specific properties 
of the nodal prices in nodes }{i , containing generating units of 
the firm g , provided that conditions of the Proposition 1 hold 
for all  hours of the day. However, as the network power flow 
can change during the day, the power flow constraints may 
imply some binding constraints on variables x  only in a few 
hours of the day. To address that issue, we generalize the 
statement of the Proposition 1 to a subset of hours of the day 
to account for hour specific conditions. 
Let’s partition }24;...;2;1{}{  iI  - the set of possible 
values of composite index ),( hi  - into III
~ˆ  with 
0
~ˆ II  . That induces a split of the variables x  into 
)~,ˆ( xxx   with hixx ,ˆ  , Ihi ˆ),(  , hixx ,~  , Ihi
~
),(  . We 
note that for a particular node i  the variable hix ,  can belong 
to xˆ  at a certain hour h  of a day and belong to x~  at another 
hour of the day. Let’s further assume that the constraints 
)}({ xCx  split into )}
~(),ˆ({)}({ ~ˆ xCxCxC xxx  . Analogously to the 
treatment in the previous section, we define by xD~  the 
feasible set for x~ , i.e., the set of x~  such that there exists
 
),,ˆ( uyx , so that ),,( uyx  satisfies the constraint set }{G , and 
by )~(),,ˆ( xD uyx the set of all those ),,ˆ( uyx  for a given value of 
xDx ~
~ . Let’s define )ˆ(ˆ xU g  and )
~(
~
xU g  - firm g  offer costs 
function for xˆ  and x~  respectively – through 
)~(
~
)ˆ(ˆ)( xUxUxU ggg  ,
 
and define }{C  as 
)}(),,(),,(),(),ˆ({}{ ˆ uCuyCuxCyCxCC uyuxuyx . We also define: 
)]ˆ(ˆ)([max)~(
)~(),,ˆ(
,,,ˆ
),,ˆ(
xUyUxW gg
xDuyx
uyx
g
uyx

 .
 (10) 
Introducing costless power injections }{
,hia  for
 
Ihi
~
),(  , we 
arrive at the following generalization of the Proposition 1. 
Proposition 2. If the following assumptions, additional to 
explicit assumptions stated in section II, are met: there exists  
xDx ~
*~   such that 
1. for any x~  in )~(
*x  - some neighborhood of 
*~~ xx   - the 
problem (10) has a unique solution
 
)~(ˆˆ * xxx  , )~(* xyy  ,
 
)~(* xuu  , and these functions are continuous in )~( *x ; 
2. in some neighborhood of )~(ˆˆ * xxx  , )~(* xyy   the function 
)ˆ(ˆ)( xUyU gg   is twice continuously differentiable;   
3. the set of constraints of a problem (10), binding at the 
solution of (10) for any x~  in )~(
*x , is given by the reduced 
constraint set }{C  with cardinality no higher than 
|||||ˆ| uyx  ; 
4. the set of binding constraints }{C  satisfies constraint 
qualification at the solution of (4) for 
*~~ xx  : rank of  
 
)~(),~(),~(ˆˆˆ ******
,,
xuuxyyxxx
m
u
m
y
m
x CCC   is maximal; 
5. if the kernel of 
 
)~(),~(),~(ˆˆˆ ******
,,
xuuxyyxxx
m
u
m
y
m
x CCC 
 
is 
nontrivial, then we assume that the Hessian matrix with 
respect to ),,ˆ( uyx  of the Lagrangian 
),,()~()ˆ(ˆ)(),,( uyxCxxUyUuyxL m
m
mgg   at 
*~~ xx  , )~(ˆˆ ** xxx  , )~( ** xyy  , )~( ** xuu  , restricted to the 
kernel  is invertible, where )}~({ xm  denote Lagrange 
multipliers associated with the reduced set of binding 
constraints }{C  (for m  corresponding to ),
~(,~ uxC
hi
ux  we 
denote )~(xm  by )
~(, xhi ); 
then there exists an open neighborhood of *~~ xx   such that 
for any x~  in that neighborhood the following statements are 
true: 
a. the hourly nodal prices hi,
 
 for  Ihi
~
),(   are 
independent from the firm g  offers in Ihi
~
),(  ; 
b. 
hi,  
 for Ihi
~
),(   are continuously differentiable 
functions of x~  and matrix 
hi
hi xx

 ,,
~/)~(  is symmetric under 
),(),( hihi   for Ihihi
~
),(),,(  ; 
c. if  in addition in some open neighborhood of )~(ˆˆ ** xxx  , 
)~( ** xyy  ,
 
)~( ** xuu   the function )ˆ(ˆ)( xUyU gg    is 
(weakly) concave and the set }{C  is convex (viewed as 
functions of variables ),,ˆ( uyx ), then there is an open 
neighborhood of  *~~ xx   such that the matrix hihi xx

 ,,
~/)~(  
for
 
Ihihi
~
),(),,( 
 
is negative (semi-)definite in that 
neighborhood.  
The proof of the Proposition 2 is fully analogous to the one 
of Proposition 1. 
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IV.  EXAMPLE 
In this section we consider an example illustrating the 
findings in the case of a model involving binding 
intertemporal constraint. Consider one node two generating 
units model with DAM solved for a time period composed of 
two consecutive hours }2;1{h . Let demand be given by 
)5.1( 1
Dyn 
 
and )3( 2
Dyn 
 
in the first and second hour 
respectively with positive parameter   having units of 
2)/($ MWh , while nonnegative parameter n  and optimization 
variables Dy1 , 
Dy2  having units of power volume. Let the firm 
g  supply hx  units of power in hour h , and the other firm g  , 
operating a generator with maximal output n4  and upward 
ramping constrained by n , offer a price 4/7 n  to supply 
volume of power Sy1  in the first hour, and a price n  to 
supply volume of power Sy2  in the second hour. The utility 
function for a subproblem (4) is given by  
SSDDDD
g nynyynyynyyU 21
2
22
2
11 4/7]2/)(3[]2/)(5.1[)(    
with the following constraints:  
nyD 5.10 1  , ny
D 30 2  , ny
S
h 50 
, D
h
S
hh yyx  , nyy
SS  12 .  
For  sufficiently small positive 
*
hx , }2;1{h , there is an 
open neighborhood )( *x  such that feasible set for variables 
},,,{ 2121
SSDD yyyy  is nonempty, the maximizer is unique and 
continuous in ),( 21 xx :  
2/)(8/3),( 21211 xxnxxy
D  , 2/)(8/11),( 12212 xxnxxy
D  , 
2/)(8/3),( 21211 xxnxxy
S  , 2/)(8/11),( 21212 xxnxxy S  , 
with hourly prices 
]2/)(8/9[),( 12211 xxnxx  ,  ]2/)(8/13[),( 21212 xxnxx   .  (11) 
We note that due to the presence of the binding 
intertemporal constraint the hourly nodal prices are not given 
by the intersection of supply and demand curves in that hour. 
Also, in the first hour the nodal price is below the average 
variable cost of the firm g   and it suffers a financial loss in 
that hour. However, in the second hour the firm g   operates 
profitably with high margin. Due to the ramping constraint it 
is overall profitable for the firm g   to produce some power in 
the first hour (incurring financial losses) to be able to produce 
more power in the second hour (with a profit exceeding the 
losses of the previous hour). As g  increases injection in the 
first hour, it lowers the nodal price in that hour and makes g   
lower output in the first hour, which – due to the binding 
ramping constraint – results in lower production by g   in the 
second hour as well, thus increasing the nodal price in the 
second hour to compensate for higher economic losses per unit 
of power in the first hour. That is the mechanism of the nodal 
price increase in the second hour due to increase of power 
injection by g  in the first hour.  
Mathematically, in )(
*x  the upward ramping constraint is 
the only binding inequality constraint, and the set of binding 
constraints },{ 12 nyyyyxC
SSD
h
S
hh   is unaltered and 
satisfies the constraint qualification at the solution. The kernel 
of 
)(y*
)(
xyy
C

  is spanned by SSDD yyyy 2121   , and 
hence the Hessian of the Lagrangian function is invertible in 
the tangent space of the surface, defined by the binding 
constraints. Therefore, assumptions of the Proposition 1 hold 
and we have  
1221 // xx   , 
which agrees with the direct computation using (11). This 
examples shows that nodal price in the first hour depends on 
the firm g  injection in the second hour and vise versa. Thus, 
consideration of binding intertemporal constraints is important 
in multi-period DAM model. Also, the 2x2 matrix nodal price 
response matrix is negative semi-definite with eigenvalues 
)(,0  , the null vector and the eigenvector are given by )1,1(  
and )1,1(   respectively. In the given example changing 
production volumes by the same amount in each hour will not 
change the nodal prices, whereas increasing the injection in 
one hour and decreasing it by the same amount in the other 
hour is the most efficient way to exploit the sensitivity of 
nodal prices with respect to the firm g  production volumes 
(that also directly follows from (11) as the firm’s injections 
enter the nodal prices only in )( 12 xx  combination).    
V.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper we studied properties of the nodal price 
response in DAM with respect to infinitesimal injections of 
costless power by a firm g , operating generating units 
assigned to different nodes. The constraint set of the DAM 
optimization problem includes (possibly, intertemporal) 
constraints on power consumption/production volumes 
specified by the market players and constraint set originating 
from the network (power flow equations, limits on power 
flows, etc.). We have shown that if the reduced set of binding 
constraint (defined as the full set of binding constraints 
excluding g ’s generating units constraints such as 
minimal/maximal output, ramping, etc.) doesn’t induce any 
additional binding constraints on the production volumes by 
the firm g , then (given validity of the other assumptions, 
stated in Proposition 1) the nodal price response matrix is 
symmetric and negative (semi-)definite for all hours of the 
day: matrix hi
hi xx

 ,, /)(  is symmetric under 
),(),( hihi  . Symmetry property of the nodal price 
response matrix is analogous to the statement of the 
reciprocity theorem for networks, which implies that if 
electromagnetic force insertion in one loop produces a current 
in another loop, then insertion by the electromagnetic force in 
the position of the current produces equal current in the first 
loop. That result is further extended in Proposition 2 for the 
case, when additional binding constraints are absent only for a 
subset of hours of the day. These findings can be viewed as 
generalization of results obtained in [5], [9] to the case of 
power systems with nonlinear and intertemporal constraints. 
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VI.  APPENDIX 
In this section we recall some basic properties of the 
Lagrange multiplier derivatives over exogenous parameters in 
constrained optimization problem  
)(max 
)},(.{.
,
vF
vxGts
v
   (12) 
with Xx , v , where X  and   are open subsets of 
Euclidean spaces ||xR  and 
||vR  respectively, )(vF  is twice 
continuously differentiable objective function defined on  , 
constraints )},({ vxG  are defined on X  and specify 
equality as well as weak inequality constraints. Functions 
),( vxG  are assumed to be twice continuously differentiable 
functions of the variables ),( vx  with x  specifying a set of 
exogenous parameters }{ ixx  , ||,...,1 xi  . The feasible set 
defined by )},({ vxG  for each Xx  is assumed to be 
nonempty compact (bounded and closed) set in  . The 
extreme value theorem implies that for each x  there exists at 
least one solution for v  belonging to the feasible set and 
maximizing (12). We emphasize that under the stated 
assumptions even if the objective function and constraints are 
smooth functions and there is unique maximizer of (12), the 
value function and maximizer of (12) in general case need not 
be continuous functions of the parameters x . 
We will make the following additional assumptions on (12): 
there exists Xx *  such that 
a) for any x  in )( *x  - an open neighborhood of 
*x , 
Xx )( * , - the problem (12) has unique solution, denoted as 
)(* xvv  , and function )(
* xv  is continuous in )(
*x ; 
b) the set of binding constraints is unaltered in )( *x  (we 
denote by )},({ vxC
m
, Mm ,...,1 , the subset of )},({ vxG  
representing constraints, binding at *xх  , )( ** xvv  ); 
c)  |||| vMx   and all functions ),( vxC
m
 have the form 
mmm xvcvxC  )(),( ; 
d) rank of  
)( **
),(
x
m
v vxC    is maximal; 
e) if the kernel of  
)( **
),(
x
m
v vxC    is nontrivial, then we 
assume that the Hessian matrix with respect to v  of the 
Lagrangian function ),()()(),(  xCxFxL m
m
m  at 
*xх  , )( ** xvv  , i.e., 
*
** )(
2
xx
xv LD

 , restricted to the kernel 
of  
)( **
),(
xvv
m
v vxC  , is invertible (where )}({ xm  denote 
Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints )},({ vxC
m
).  
A few consequences readily follow: assumption on twice 
continuous differentiability of ),( vxG  implies that functions 
)(vcm  are also twice continuously differentiable, which – 
given continuity of )(
* xv  in )(
*x  - implies continuity of 
)( **
),(
xvv
m
v vxC   in )(
*x ; the latter coupled with 
assumption “d” entails, that there is a neighborhood of 
*x , 
such that rank of 
)( **
),(
xvv
m
v vxC   is maximal in that 
neighborhood. Likewise, there is an open neighborhood of 
*x , such that assumption “e” is valid for all x  in that 
neighborhood 
The Lagrange method is applicable in some )( *x , (the 
footnote 1 is applicable to the present section as well), and we 
have the following set of equations, representing the first-
order necessary condition for a critical point )( *xx  : 





MmvxC
L
m
v
,..,1,0),(
0 ,  (13) 
supplemented with nonnegativity conditions for Lagrange 
multipliers associated with binding inequality constraints. 
Given the function )(
* xv , maximality of ),( vxCmv  rank in 
)( *x  allows to solve 0 Lv  for )(
* xmm  , Mm ,...,1 , 
in some )(
*x . Continuity of )(* xv  and twice continuous 
differentiability of )(vF  as well as ),( vxC
m
, Mm ,...,1 , 
imply that )(
* xm are continuous in that )(
*x . 
It follows from [11] that rank of 
)( **
),(
xvv
m
v vxC   is 
maximal and 
*
** )(
2
xx
xv LD

 , restricted to the kernel of  
)( **
),(
xvv
m
v vxC  , is invertible (with the latter condition 
present only if the kernel is nontrivial) if and only if the 
bordered Hessian matrix defined by 
  
 
 
))(,(x
2
***0 xv
T
vv
C
CLD
H










  (14) 
is invertible. We note that since determinant of H  is nonzero 
at *xх   and is continuous function of х , it is also nonzero in 
some )(
*x .  
It is well known, [12], that nondegeneracy preserving 
substitution ),(),( vxCvxC
mm   in the bordered Hessian 
matrix produces Jacobian matrix for a set of equations (13). 
Hence implicit function theorem implies that in some 
neighborhood of ( *xх  , )( ** xvv  , )( ** xmm  ) there 
exists a unique (continuously differentiable with respect to x ) 
solution of (13). We stress that in general case that doesn’t 
imply that the solution to (12) is unique and/or continuously 
differentiable as the implicit function theorem provides a local 
solution to the necessary condition for extremum, while the 
optimization problem might have multiple and/or 
discontinuous solutions.  However in our case assumptions of 
uniqueness and continuity of solution )(
* xvv   of (12) in 
some neighborhood of *xх   implies that that solution is the 
one identified by the implicit function theorem, and there is 
)( *x  such that )(* xv  is continuously differentiable function 
in that neighborhood. Since )(vF  is twice continuously 
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differentiable function and in the neighborhood )( *x  the 
maximizer of (12) )(* xvv   is unique and continuously 
differentiable, the value function for (12) defined by 
))(()( * xFxV   is also continuously differentiable in )( *x . 
Note that we can remove the assumption “e”, if the 
assumption “a” is extended to require that )(* xv  is 
continuously differentiable functions in )( *x . In that case, 
the continuous differentiability of )(* xm  follows directly 
from 0 Lv  utilizing constraint qualification, which entails 
that in some )( *x  the matrix 
)(
||,...,1
*),(),( x
s
m
v
m
v
vxCvxC ss 












  is invertible. 
Constraint qualification and ||M  also imply that a set 
)},({ vxCm  doesn’t not impose any constraints on the possible 
values of x  (even for a case when the constraints do not have 
the form 
mmm xvcvxC  )(),( ): there is no continuously 
differentiable function ),( xCS  in some neighborhood of 
( x , )(* xvv  ),  such that it is a function of x  only: 
0),(  xCSv  with 0),( xCSdx  and   0/
2

m
mCS . 
That conclusion is compatible with the constant rank theorem. 
The continuity of the function )(* xv  in some open 
neighborhood of *x , as stated in assumption “a”, can be 
replaced by more fundamental assumptions on the constraints 
functions )},({ vxG . One such example is given by the Berge’s 
Maximal Theorem in the framework of constraints generated 
correspondence. 
Economic interpretation of the Lagrange multiplies as 
shadow prices [13] is given by the Envelope Theorem [14], 
which we reformulate below in a way suitable for our 
purposes. 
The Envelope Theorem: If ),( azf , 
),(1 azg ,…, ),( azg P , ),(1 azh ,…, ),( azhT , are continuously 
differentiable functions of ),( az  on 
|||| az RR   and there is 
aD  - an open subset of 
||aR , such that for any aDa  
 )(* az - is the unique solution of the optimization problem 
),(max)(
0),(
,0),(
..
,||
azfaV
azh
azg
ts
Rz
t
p
z




  (15) 
 with Pp ,...,1 , Tt ,...,1 ; 
 )(* az  is continuously differentiable function of a  in aD ; 
 in aD   the set of constraints binding at )(
* az  is unaltered, 
has cardinality no higher than || z , and satisfies the 
constraint qualification condition. We denote the binding 
constraints by ),( azC l  and the corresponding Lagrange 
multipliers by )(al , Ll ,...,1 , TPLP  ; 
then for any aDa  the value function )(aV  is continuously 
differentiable function of a and  satisfies 
)(,..,1
*
)( **
),()(),()(
azz
l
Ll
l
azz
azC
a
aazf
a
aV
a





















, (16) 
where )(* al  
denote the solution for the Lagrange multiplier 
l , Ll ,...,1 . 
The proof of continuous differentiability of the value 
function readily follows from uniqueness of the maximizer 
and continuous differentiability of the objective function and 
the maximizer, while application of the chain rule to 
aaazf  /)),(( *  together with the first-order necessary 
condition, stability of the binding constraint set in aD , and 
utilization of 0/)),(( *  aaazC l , Ll ,...,1 , yields (16). 
We also note that uniqueness of the solution for )(
* az  and the 
constraint qualification imply uniqueness of the solution for 
)(* al  in aD . 
In some formulations of the Envelope Theorem continuous 
differentiability of )(
* al , associated with inequality 
constraints, is also required but condition of stability of the 
binding constraint set in aD  is omitted. 
We note that if the set of binding constraints is unaltered in 
aD  and constraint qualification is satisfied at some point 
aDaa 
* , then there is an open set 
aa DD  , such that the 
constraint qualification holds for any aDa  .  
Let’s denote by )(aDz  the feasible set of z , defined by the 
constraints in (15), and partition variables z  into ),( vxz  , 
and let )(aDx  be the feasible set for x , i.e., the set of all x  
such that there exists v , such that ),( vxz   belongs to )(aDz , 
and let ),( axDv  be the set of all those   for a given value of 
)(aDx x . In the correspondence formalism )(aDx  and 
),( axDv  are respectively identified as domain and image of x  
under (parameterized by a ) correspondence, defined by map 
of feasible values of x  into a subset of ||vR , which contains 
the union of ),( axDv  over all )(aDx x .  
Let’s define 
),(max),(
),(
,||
azfaxQ
axD
R







,  (17) 
then we have 
),(max)(
)(
,||
axQaV
aDx
Rx
x
x



.        (18) 
Lemma 1. Let assumptions of The Envelope Theorem hold 
for optimization problem (15), the variables z  and the 
constraints, binding in aD , ),( azC
l , Ll ,...,1 , can be 
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partitioned into sets ),( xz   and })
~
{},({}{
~
lll CCC  , 
Ll ,...,1 , Ll
~
,...,1
~
 , respectively, such that  
1. }
~
{
~
lC  are independent from both   and a , )(
~~ ~~
xCC ll  ; 
2. ||L
 
and rank of
 )(*
/),,(
azz
l axC

   is maximal in 
aD ; 
3. for any ),( ax  such that )(aDx x , aDa , the maximizer 
for optimization problem (17) is unique and continuously 
differentiable function with respect to ),( ax ; 
then  
)(*
),()(
axx
axQ
a
aV
a












, aDa . 
Proof: From assumptions of the Lemma 1 it follows that the 
function ),( axQ  is continuously differentiable with respect to  
),( ax  for )(aDx x , aDa . Since maximizer for (15) is 
unique and continuously differentiable function of a , so it is 
for (18). As }{
lC  do not induce any constraints on x  due to 
assumption 2 of the Lemma 1, the constraints )(
~~ ~~
xCC ll   are 
the only binding constraints corresponding to )(aDx . Hence, 
the Envelope Theorem is applicable to (18), which yields the 
statement of the Lemma 1.  
Lemma 2. Let assumptions of The Envelope Theorem hold 
for optimization problem (15), objective function f  is 
independent from a , the variables z  and the constraints, 
binding in aD , ),( azC
l , Ll ,...,1 , can be partitioned into 
),( xz   and })
~
{},({}{
~
lll CCC  , Ll ,...,1 , Ll
~
,...,1
~
 , 
respectively, such that |||| xa  and 
1. the objective function is additively separable: 
)(
~
)( xfff   ; 
2. }
~
{
~
lC  are independent from both   and a , )(
~~ ~~
xCC ll  , 
Ll
~
,...,1
~
 ; 
3.  variables x  and a  enter }{ lC  in such a way that  
),( axCC ll  , Ll ,...,1 ; 
4. ||L  and rank of 
)(*
/),,(
azz
l axC

   is maximal in 
aD ; 
5. for any ),( ax  such that )(aDx x , aDa , the maximizer 
for optimization problem 
)(max),(
),(
,||





faxW
axD
R



   (19) 
is unique and continuously differentiable with respect to 
),( ax ; 
then )( axWW   and  
)(*
/)(/)(
axx
xaxWaaV

 , 
aDa . Also, if aDa  }0{ , then 
 
)0(0 *
/)(/)(
xxa
xxWaaV

 . 
Proof: Both continuous differentiability of )(f  and 
maximizer for (19) as well as uniqueness of the latter ensure 
that ),( axW  is continuously differentiable function of both 
variables. Lemma 2 assumptions imply that KKT method is 
applicable to the problem (19) and since a  and x  enter the 
first-order necessary conditions only through )( ax  , we 
have )(),( axWaxW  . Application of the Lemma 1 
completes the proof: 
 
)()( **
)()(
~
)()(
axxaxx
axW
x
xfaxW
a
aV
a





















 , aDa , 
with immediate result for the case aDa  }0{ .  
Symmetry of  ji xx  /)(
*  
Applicability of the Envelope Theorem for (12) follows from 
the considerations above and, hence,   
i
i xxvFx  /))(()(
**  in )( *x . (20) 
However, the function )(
* xi  is continuously differentiable in 
)( *x , hence the value function ))(()( * xvFxV   is twice 
continuously differentiable in that neighborhood. That in turn 
implies  
jij
i xxxvFxx  /))((/)(
*2* , (21) 
and, therefore, the square matrix 
j
i xx  /)(
*
 is symmetric in 
)( *x . These results readily follows from  
0/)(/ *
)(
)(
*
* 


s
is
x
xvv
s xxvvL  using  
0
)(),(),( *
)()( **









 s
i
s
xvv
s
m
xvv
i
m
x
xv
v
vxC
x
vxC .             (22) 
Symmetry of 
j
i xx  /)(
*
  can be also linked to the symmetry 
of Hessian matrix of L with respect to variables v :  












ks
j
k
i
s
x
xvv
ksj
i
x
xv
x
xv
vv
L
x
x
,
**
)(
)(
2* )()()(
*
*
         (23) 
in )(
*x , which implies that the square matrix ji xx  /)(
*
 is 
symmetric. Eq. (23) also entails 
j
k
ksm
i
s
xvv
ks
m
m
ks
j
k
i
s
xvv
ksj
i
x
xv
x
xv
vv
vxC
x
x
xv
x
xv
vv
vF
x
x




















)()(),(
)(
)()()()(
*
,,
*
)(
2
*
,
**
)(
2*
*
*
. (24) 
Sign definiteness of ji xx  /)(
*  
Since in )(
*x  the function )(* x   is solution to (12), 
and bordered Hessian is invertible, the square matrix 
)(
2
*
/
xvv
ks vvL

  defines negative definite form in the kernel of 
),( vxCmv , i.e., for v  preserving the constraints. However, 
as is xxv  /)(*  doesn’t belong to the kernel due to the term 
)(*
/),(
xvv
im xvxC

  in equation (22), in general case (23) 
doesn’t imply that ji xx  /)(
*
 is negative definite or 
negative semi-definite matrix. We note for the case of convex 
optimization problem the negative semi-definiteness of 
 10 
j
i xx  /)(
*  in )( *x  follows from (24). Also, (22) and 
assumed structure of )},({ vxCm
 
entail that 
0)/)(( *  ii
is xxv   with any non-zero vector  . Hence, 
for the cases of convex optimization problem with strictly 
concave function )(vF , the matrix 
j
i xx  /)(
*  is negative 
definite in )( *x . 
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